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MAKING SENSE OUT OF THE
RULE OF REASON
Ernest Gellhorn*
Teresa Tatham**
Courts analyzing horizontal and vertical agreements between business entities
once had a clearpath to decision. If the agreement was of a certain kind, such as
price-fixing, it was per se illegal and nojustificationcould overcome that characterization. If the agreement was of another kind, such as information-sharingamong
members of a trade association, it was legal unless found to be unreasonable
The authorsargue that the previous cleardivision between the per se rule and the
rule of reason has been blurred by recent Supreme Court decisions, and that many
traditionally illegalrestraintsare now being subjected to the rule of reason analysis.
The purpose of the Article is to provide guidancefor those seeking to understandwhat
factors will be taken into account by courts applying the developing rule of reason
standard.

INTRODUCTION

HISTORICALLY, TWO standards have been applied to antitrust
violations. The per se rule condemned certain activities auto-

matically. Price-fixing, for example, was subjected to the per se
rule. This standard traditionally has not allowed the defendant to
justify the alleged violation; once a plaintiff establishes the violation,
he will triumph. The rule of reason standard was reserved for instances in which the activity might be beneficial, such as certain
agreements among members of a trade association. Under this standard, evidence of market conditions, justifications for the activity,
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and actual or potential effects on competition could be considered.
In recent years, the distinction between these two standards has become blurred. The courts, following the lead of the Supreme Court,
are analyzing traditional per se antitrust violations under the less
strict rule of reason standard, or conducting a rule of reason type of
analysis to determine whether the per se test should be applied.
This trend makes it increasingly important to understand the rule of
reason test.
The Supreme Court's initial opinions applying the rule of reason
to alleged antitrust violations indicate that the economic effects of
the activities are crucial to the analysis. However, the Court has
failed to provide guidance on the specific factors to be considered.
The rule of reason has not been authoritatively reviewed since the
Supreme Court held in Continental T. V, Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc.1
that nonprice vertical restraints were to be judged under the rule of
reason. Lower courts have struggled with the language of Sylvania
and its emphasis on the "pernicious effects" and the "redeeming
virtues" of an activity. These courts have examined market shares,
the effect on competition, and possible justifications for the restraints. It is to these opinions that one must turn to begin to understand the rule of reason standard. The lower court opinions,
however, are not always clear and provide only a basis for continual
development of the new standards. The Supreme Court and many
lower courts often appear to be embracing a modern approach to
antitrust economics, which provides an opportunity to clarify and
rationalize this rule of reason.
I.

THE BREAKDOWN OF THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN THE PER
SE RULE AND THE RULE OF REASON

Courts apply two standards to analyze collusive practices under
antitrust statutes.2 Horizontal price-fixing 3 and horizontal territorial allocations 4 are prototypical practices to which an automatic
prohibition-the per se rule-is applied. Each involves an agreement among direct competitors where the effect on competition, in
the form of reduced output and increased prices, creates an unjusti1. 433 U.S. 36 (1977).
2. Sherman Antitrust Act, ch. 647, §§ 1-2, 26 Stat. 209 (1890) (current version at 15
U.S.C. §§ 1-2 (1982)).
3. See, eg., United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150 (1940) (price-fixing
among oil producers).
4. See, e.g., United States v. Topco Assocs., 405 U.S. 596 (1972) (market division
among retail grocers).
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fled welfare loss. The per se rule makes these practices illegal without further consideration of their purpose, justification, or effect on
the market. Vertical price-fixing, an agreement between suppliers
and their customers to keep resale prices at a fixed level, also is
subject to the per se rule, although the economic justifications for
automatically prohibiting such arrangements are not wellgrounded.5
The per se rule applies as well to exclusionary practices by individual firms which monopolize 6 or attempt to create monopolies.7
The per se rule also is applied to joint actions such as vertical tie-in
agreements where appreciable market power exists8 and to some
group boycotts.9 The concern over these practices is that those
seeking or sustaining a dominant position will limit entry or will
make it unprofitable for others to compete by undercutting prices.
As a result, these dominant firms will attain a larger share of the
market and be able to set prices and production at noncompetitive
levels. The justification for applying the per se rule to these exclusionary practices is the potential welfare loss, in the form of higher
prices and reduced output, that monopolistic practices can impose
on society.
Many horizontal agreements are encouraged or, at least, not
evaluated so unfavorably. Horizontal arrangements such as a trade
association's publication of market statistics from its members 0 or
a cooperative program of institutional advertising by all or some
firms in an industry are not subject to the per se rule. Courts
apply the more lenient rule of reason standard to such arrangements. 2 In applying this test, courts consider a number of factors:
justifications for the practice, potential harm from the arrangement,
market power of the participants, and the effect on competition.
5. See Posner, The Rule of Reason and the Economic Approach. Reflections on the
Sylvania Decision, 45 U. CH. L. REv. 1 (1977); Bork, The Rule of Reason and the Per se
ConcepL" Price-Fixingand Market Division (pt. 2), 75 YALE L.J. 373 (1966).
6. See L. SULLIVAN, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF ANTITRUST §§ 33-39 (1977).
7. Id. §§ 49-52.
8. Id. §§ 150-156. See also Jefferson Parish Hosp. v. Hyde, 104 S. Ct. 1551, 1561-68
(1984) (discussion of the legality of tie-in arrangements).
9. L. SULLIVAN, supra note 6, at §§ 83-90. But see Vogel v. American Soc'y Appraisers, 744 F.2d 598, 600 (7th Cir. 1984) (boycotts are per se illegal only if used to enforce a
practice that is itself illegal).
10. See, ag., Maple Flooring Mfrs. Ass'n v. United States, 268 U.S. 563 (1925) (information-sharing among manufacturers).
11. See S. OPPENHEIMER, G. WESTON & J. MCCARTHY, FEDERAL ANTITRUST LAWS

102 (4th ed. 1981).
12. But see Gerhart, The Supreme CourtandAntitrust Analysis: The (Near) Triumph of
the ChicagoSchool, 1982 Sup. Cr. REv. 319.
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The courts generally allow the arrangement if potential benefits to
competition outweigh immediate or potential harm.
A.

Consumer Welfare Approach

The previous bright line between per se illegality and rule of
reason legality has begun to break down in recent years as the
courts, particularly the Supreme Court, have developed a more sophisticated understanding of antitrust economics. The reasons for
this breakdown are numerous. First, it is thought to be economically beneficial to encourage all firms-even those with market
power-to expand output and to sell their goods and services at
competitive prices. Therefore, courts generally adopt the rule of
reason approach if the challenged action can be characterized as
ancillary to "legitimate business practices." 13
Another factor is that courts have come to recognize important
distinctions between horizontal and vertical collusion. In the past,
courts sometimes borrowed antitrust concepts developed for horizontal arrangements-involving direct competitors-and applied
them to vertical practices-involving suppliers and their customers-without considering inherent analytical differences and basic
economic distinctions. For example, the per se rule of Dr. Miles
Medical Co. v. John D. Park & Sons Co. 4 is applied to prohibit all
resale price maintenance even though vertical price-fixing has long
been shown to serve ends very different from horizontal price-fixing.15 However, when the challenged practice appears to be clearly
desirable, courts sometimes employ artful distinctions to avoid automatic prohibitions. Finally, there is increasing recognition that
the most appropriate goal for the antitrust laws is to promote "consumer welfare" by fostering economic efficiency rather than by protecting smaller firms from the pressures of competition. This
recognition reflects growing economic sophistication on the part of
13. See United States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co., 85 F. 271 (6th Cir. 1898) (Taft, J.),
modified and aft'd, 175 U.S. 211 (1899); R. BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX: A POLICY
AT WAR WITH ITSELF 26-30, 263-79 (1978). See also NCAA v. Board of Regents of the
Univ. of Okla., 104 S. Ct. 2948 (1984) (although a certain amount of cooperation is needed to
maintain competition in college athletics, an agreement restricting television rights inhibited
competition and, therefore, failed a rule of reason analysis); Broadcast Music, Inc. v. CBS,
441 U.S. 1 (1979) (agreement among composers to sell their compositions for a fixed price
passes rule of reason analysis because restraint is necessary to encourage production).
14. 220 U.S. 373 (1911).
15. See, e.g., Telser, Why Should Manufacturers Want Fair Trade?, 3 J.L. & ECON. 86
(1960); Bork, supra note 5; cf Brief of the Department of Justice, as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioner, Spray-Rite Serv. Corp. v. Monsanto Co., 684 F.2d 1226 (7th Cir. 1982),
affd on other grounds, 104 S.Ct. 1464 (1984).
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the judiciary, as well as greater political acceptance of the need to
foster economic growth. A number of recent cases illustrate the
trend away from application of the per se rule.
In Broadcast Music, Inc. v. CBS,16 the Supreme Court remanded, for a rule of reason analysis, an agreement among a group
of composers to issue a blanket license to CBS to perform the composers' songs at set fees. The Court concluded that a pricing arrangement which is essential to a legitimate purpose is not within
the per se rule otherwise applied to horizontal price-fixing unless it
is " 'plainly anticompetitive' and very likely without 'redeeming virtue.' ,,17 The Court said the arrangement was essential to the production of the compositions and, therefore, served a legitimate
purpose in the marketplace. Further, the Court specified that in
deciding whether to apply the per se or rule of reason standard, the
lower court should analyze whether the practices "facially. . .tend
to restrict competition and decrease output . . . or instead are
designed to 'increase economic efficiency and render markets more,
rather than less, competitive.' "I'
The 1983 Supreme Court Term produced three cases which further exemplify the Court's tendency to avoid rigid application of the
per se rule. In NCAA v. Board of Regents of the University of
Oklahoma,19 the Court refused to apply the per se rule to allegations that the NCAA had fixed prices for telecasts of college football games and that the exclusive network contracts were
tantamount to a group boycott of all other broadcasters.' 0 The
Court stated that although the use of exclusive contracts to limit the
number of televised games constituted horizontal price-fixing and
limits on output, it would be inappropriate to apply the per se rule
to "an industry in which horizontal restraints on competition are
essential if the product is to be available at all."" 1 Nonetheless, the
Court, after a rule of reason analysis, concluded that the arrangements were an unreasonable restraint on competition. 2
In Jefferson Parish Hospital v. Hyde, 3 the Court in effect applied a rule of reason analysis to a tying arrangement involving an
16. 441 U.S. 1 (1979).
17. Id. at 9.
18. Id. at 19-20 (quoting United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. 422, 441
n.16 (1978)).
19. 104 S.Ct. 2948 (1984).
20. Id. at 2960.
21. Id. at 2961.
22. Id. at 2962-67.
23. 104 S.Ct. 1551 (1984).
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exclusive hospital contract with a firm of anesthesiologists. 4 The
Court stated that tying arrangements have been condemned only
"when the seller has some special ability-usually called 'market
power'-to force a purchaser to do something that he would not do
in a competitive market."2 5 This statement limits the per se rule to
a narrow field. The Court found that the hospital's thirty percent
market share was not enough market power to prevent a patient
from entering a competing hospital and using the services of other
anesthesiologists.2 6 Applying a rule of reason analysis, the Court
found that there was insufficient evidence to show that the arrangement unreasonably restrained competition.27
Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Service Corp.2 further illustrates the
Court's unwillingness to apply a per se rule rigidly. Spray-Rite, a
cut-rate distributor of herbicides, claimed that Monsanto, directly
and through customer and territorial restraints, conspired to fix the
resale price of its herbicides.2 9 The district court instructed the jury
that if it found that the nonprice restrictions were part of an unlawful scheme to fix prices, Monsanto's actions were subject to the per
se rule against price-fixing.3" Its ruling was affirmed by the Seventh
Circuit.3 1 More importantly, the appellate court held that "proof of
termination following competitor complaints is sufficient to support
an inference of concerted action."3 2 The implications of such a low
standard for inferring collusion are obvious. A manufacturer who
independently terminates a dealer for failure to comply with legitimate vertical restraints and who also has received price complaints
about that dealer will find it almost impossible to refute the inference of concerted action. The result will be application of the per se
rule and probable treble damages. In light of this standard, it was
not surprising that the court upheld the jury finding for Spray-Rite.
The Supreme Court rejected the minimal standard of proof required by the Seventh Circuit to establish a conspiracy.33 The
Court emphasized the basic distinction between independent and
24. Id.
25. Id. at 1559.
26. Id. at 1566.
27. Id. at 1567-68.
28. 104 S. Ct. 1464 (1984).
29. Id. at 1467.
30. Id.
31. Id. at 1468.
32. Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Serv. Corp., 684 F.2d 1226, 1238 (7th Cir. 1982), affid
on other grounds, 104 S. Ct. 1464 (1984).
33. 104 S. Ct. at 1468. There had been a longstanding conflict between the circuits as to
the proper standard of proof for establishing the existence of concerted action. See id. at n.5.
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concerted action and reminded lower courts that a manufacturer
has a right to deal, or refuse to deal, with whomever he wishes as
long as that right is exercised independently.3" The Court noted
that as a natural course of doing business, manufacturers and distributors are in constant communication about prices and marketing strategies." This is especially true when a manufacturer
implements nonprice restrictions as a marketing strategy. Distributors who comply with such costly programs will necessarily voice
complaints to manufacturers about cut-rate distributors who benefit
from their efforts.3 6 The Court concluded that there must be evidence that tends to exclude the possibility of independent action by
the manufacturer and distributor.37 That is, there must be "direct
or circumstantial evidence that reasonably tends to prove that the
manufacturer and others had a conscious commitment to a common scheme designed to achieve an unlawful objective" 3 8 before the
per se rule will apply.
The Court appeared to require substantial proof, although it
found on the basis of ambiguous evidence39 that Monsanto and its
distributors were parties to a conspiracy to fix prices. Nonetheless,
the Court's decision illustrates its general willingness to embrace an
economic approach based on whether a particular business practice
is efficient rather than to adhere blindly to past practices of protecting small businesses regardless of the harm to consumer welfare.
The "consumer welfare" approach used by the Supreme Court
in Broadcast Music, NCAA, Hyde, and Monsanto is not novel. In
Continental T V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc.,' the Court expressly
ruled that nonprice vertical restraints, in particular territorial and
customer marketing restrictions imposed on distributors, should be
evaluated under the rule of reason.4 1 In reaching that conclusion,
34. Id. at 1469.
35. Id. at 1470.
36. Id.
37. Id. at 1471.
38. Id.
39. The Court cited two pieces of evidence in support of its decision against Monsanto.
First was testimony that in the months following Spray-Rite's termination other price-cutters
were advised that if they did not maintain prices they would be terminated. Id. Second, a
newsletter, dated four weeks before Spray-Rite's termination, discussed Monsanto's incentive
and shipping programs and stated that "every effort will be made to maintain a minimum
market price level." Id. This evidence of an alleged agreement to fix prices was linked to
Spray-Rite's termination through testimony from Spray-Rite's president that a Monsanto official mentioned price complaints in a meeting following Spray-Rite's termination. Id. at
1472.
40. 433 U.S. 36 (1977).
41. Id. at 49-59.

CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 35:155

the Court suggested several justifications for nonprice vertical restraints such as expanded product distribution, increased dealer investment, and improved customer service as well as the elimination
of "free-riders." 42 The Court also emphasized that an important
consideration should be the effect of the restriction on economic
efficiency and interbrand competition.4 3
These cases suggest that an examination of market conditions
and economic effects is necessary to determine whether the per se
rule applies in horizontal cases or whether the rule of reason standard has been satisfied in vertical cases. However, the Supreme
Court's message has been far from clear. Although BroadcastMusic, NCAA, Hyde, and Monsanto illustrate a gradual acceptance of a
"consumer welfare" approach to antitrust, the Court's most recent
opinions also reflect its reluctance to depart completely from past
precedent protecting smaller businesses regardless of efficiency considerations.' In fact, the Court ignored the primary thrust of its
decision in BroadcastMusic when it applied the per se rule in Arizona v. Maricopa County Medical Society.4"
B. Remnants of the "Civil Rights" Approach
In Maricopa, the Court was faced with a system for delivering
health care services based upon the establishment of maximum fees.
The Court disregarded the significant cost savings to consumers and
mechanically applied a per se rule. The majority's conclusory analysis simply announced that "the anticompetitive potential inherent
in all price-fixing agreements justifies their facial invalidation even if
procompetitive justifications are offered." 4 6 In an unsatisfactory attempt to distinguish Broadcast Music, the majority termed the arrangement in Maricopa "fundamentally different."'47 A sharp
dissent pointed out that it is "well settled that this [per se] characterization is not to be applied as a talisman to every arrangement
that involves a literal fixing of prices.""
Even the post-Maricopa opinions in Hyde, NCAA, and Monsanto reflect the Court's reluctance to embrace fully a careful eco42. Id. at 54-55.
43. Id.
44. See NCAA v. Board of Regents of the Univ. of Okla., 104 S. Ct. 2948 (1984); National Soc'y of Professional Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 692 (1978).
45. 457 U.S. 332 (1982).
46. Id. at 351.
47. Id. at 356.
48. Id. at 361-62.
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nomic approach to antitrust analysis.4 9 The decision in NCAA may
cause the most difficulty. The Court did consider various economic
factors in its refusal to apply the per se rule to the "naked" 5 horizontal restrictions imposed by the NCAA on the televising of football games. Nonetheless, major portions of the Court's language
are troublesome. For example, the Court stated that "the absence
of proof of market power does not justify a naked restriction on
price or output."5 This statement illustrates that the Court is not
appropriately considering the basic economic fact that without market power there can be no adverse impact on prices and output.
Hyde and Monsanto also illustrate the Court's failure to provide
a clear economic analysis of the challenged restraint. Although the
Court in Hyde in effect applied a rule of reason analysis to a tying
arrangement, it did not formally abandon application of the per se
rule to all such arrangements. Instead of reexamining the economic
validity of applying the per se rule to tying arrangements in general-which four members of the Court favored-the Court limited
the application of the rule to a narrow field. 52 Monsanto presented
another opportunity for the Court to review, in modem economic
terms, the validity of per se illegality of vertical price restraints.
The Court refused to reexamine its decision in Dr. Miles although
the same arguments that persuaded the Court in Sylvania to apply a
rule of reason to nonprice vertical restraints support the abandonment of the per se rule in resale price maintenance cases.5 3 The
Court did make it more difficult for a plaintiff in a dealer termination case to invoke the per se rule.5 4 However, because of the obvious weakness and self-serving nature of the evidence, 5 it is unclear
whether Monsanto's stated higher standard of proof will, in fact,
provide much protection for manufacturers faced with allegations
of a conspiracy to fix prices.5 6 The Court's strained effort to find
49. See Sims and Myers, Baxter Grabs Brass Ring in 1984 Antitrust Season, Legal
Times, July 23, 1984, at 10, col. I for an early and thoughtful discussion of the 1984 Supreme
Court antitrust decisions. The authors compare the "civil rights" approach of the Warren
Court with the movement toward a more modem economic approach of the current Court.
50. 104 S.Ct. at 2965.
51. Id.
52. 104 S.Ct. at 1570.
53. See supra note 5.
54. 104 S. Ct. at 1473.
55. See supra note 39.
56. Whether the lower courts will follow what the Supreme Court "said" in Monsanto
rather than what it "did" remains to be seen. See, eg., Malley-Duff & Assocs. v. Crown Life
Ins. Co., 734 F.2d 133 (3d Cir. 1984) (noting the Supreme Court's emphasis on distinguishing
concerted and unilateral action, the court found both direct and circumstantial evidence that
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evidence of concerted action and, therefore, find for the small businessman, Spray-Rite, as well as its refusal to address the validity of
its 1911 decision equating vertical and horizontal price-fixing, is illustrative of its reluctance to part with the past.
The Supreme Court has clearly moved toward acceptance of a
"consumer welfare" approach to antitrust but its inability to break
with the past has led to much confusion over the proper approach
for determining whether the per se rule is to be applied. Broadcast
Music, Hyde, NCAA, and Monsanto illustrate the economic considerations on which the Court is beginning to focus before applying
the per se rule. This economic analysis is much like the analysis
courts apply to nonprice vertical restraints under a rule of reason.
The development of the rule of reason standard has been more
abrupt and sometimes more coherent in nonprice vertical restraint
cases. The explicitness of Sylvania and its widespread acceptance in
the antitrust community has meant that direct challenges to nonprice vertical arrangements are generally treated as rule of reason
cases. Sylvania forces an examination of the economic effects and
justifications for nonprice vertical restraints. Although considerable lower court confusion still exists over the meaning of the rule of
reason standard applied in Sylvania, these lower court decisions
provide the only guidance on the meaning of the rule of reason.
II.

UNDERSTANDING THE SYLVANIA

RULE

A brief review of the law regarding restrictions on the distribution of goods and services is necessary to understand the rule of
reason standard. The standard as applied to vertical restraints grew
out of a three-quarter-century dispute concerning the right of a
manufacturer to control the distribution and price of his products
and services.
A.

DoctrinalGyrations: From Dr. Miles to Sylvania

The earliest and leading case applying antitrust standards to
vertical restraints was a tort action against a drug manufacturer for
restricting the resale price of his products through contracts with
wholesalers. In Dr. Miles,57 the Supreme Court, relying on coma life insurance agency was terminated pursuant to a group boycott between the insurance
carrier and others); St. Petersburg Yacht Charters, Inc. v. Morgan Yacht, Inc., No. 82-2704
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. May 4, 1984) (termination of a dealership after a rival dealer requested
such termination to eliminate resale price competition was not per se illegal).
57. 220 U.S. 373 (1911).

RULE OF REASON

mon law rules prohibiting restraints on the alienation of property,
held that a manufacturer who sells his product to a wholesaler is
not entitled to restrict its subsequent resale by a retailer. Although
not labeled as such, the ruling that resale price maintenance (RPM)
is injurious to the public interest and void5 8 was in effect a holding
that vertical price restraints were per se illegal. Dr. Miles was a
vertical price-fixing case, but the Court's theory and doctrine were
not necessarily limited to price agreements.
For many years the central issue was whether a manufacturer
could avoid the rule in Dr. Miles by refusing to sell to retailers who
failed to comply with his suggested price or by consigning rather
than selling the product to a distributor. In 1919, the Supreme
Court created the Colgate exception to the per se rule of Dr. Miles
by permitting a manufacturer to recommend prices unilaterally and
59
cut off retailers who failed to comply. In United States v. Colgate,
the Court observed that a manufacturer is necessarily entitled to set
the price at which his product is sold and to determine with whom
he will deal. This exception proved to be of limited use because a
manufacturer's only option to enforce the resale price was to drop
the best known price-cutter with no warning and hope that the action served as an example to other price-cutters. Subsequent
Supreme Court decisions, especially United States v. Parke,Davis &
Co.,60 further reduced the usefulness of Colgate by holding that any
method of securing compliance with a suggested retail price constituted 1an "agreement" for purposes of section 1 of the Sherman
6
Act.
The Court, in United States v. GeneralElectric Co.,62 approved a
resale price maintenance arrangement in which a dealer was a consignee of the manufacturer and, therefore, acted as his agent. The
Supreme Court cast doubt on this exception when it invalidated a
virtually identical "consignment" arrangement in Simpson v. Union
Oil Co.63 The limitations of Parke,Davis and Simpson made it difficult for a manufacturer to control the retail price of his product
unless he established his own distribution system and did not deal
with others.
58. Id. at 404.
59. 250 U.S. 300 (1919).
60. 362 U.S. 29 (1960).
61. Sherman Antitrust Act, ch. 347, § 1, 26 Stat. 209 (1890) (current version at 15
U.S.C. § 1 (1982)).
62. 272 U.S. 476 (1926).

63. 377 U.S. 13 (1964).
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The 1975 repeal64 of the Miller-Tydings Act further restricted a
manufacturer's ability to impose vertical price restraints. In the
1930's, individual states began to pass "fair trade" laws which specifically authorized manufacturers to set the resale prices of their
products. Congress approved the Miller-Tydings Act6 5 in 1937 to
validate resale price maintenance arrangements which involved interstate commerce and which were permitted under the antitrust
laws of a particular state. Judicial limitations on Colgate and General Electric and the repeal of the Miller-Tydings Act essentially
foreclosed the opportunity for vertical price restrictions. Manufacturers then focused their attention on nonprice restraints such as
territorial and customer limitations. Until the 1940's, the government did not challenge these arrangements and, in fact, such restraints were approved in several private actions.6 6
In 1944, the Supreme Court, in United States v. Bausch & Lomb
Optical Co. ,67 held vertical territorial and customer restrictions to
be per se illegal if they were an integral part of an agreement to fix
prices. Four years later, the Department of Justice, relying on
Bausch & Lomb, announced that it would treat vertical territorial
and customer restraints unaccompanied by price-fixing on the same
basis. For many years this position went unchallenged. Consent
agreements negotiated by the Department enforced the view that all
vertical restraints, whether price or nonprice, were automatically
illegal.6 8
When the Supreme Court heard its first nonprice vertical restraint case, however, it reversed a lower court's holding that territorial and customer restrictions were illegal per se. In White Motor
Co. v. United States,6 9 the Court concluded that it did not "know
enough of the economic and business stuff out of which these ar64. Consumer Goods Pricing Act, Pub. L. No. 94-145, 89 Stat. 801 (1975).
65. District of Columbia Revenue Act of 1937, ch. 690, tit. VIII, 50 Stat. 693 (repealed
1975).
66. See ABA ANTITRUST SECTION, MONOGRAPH No. 2, VERTICAL RESTRICTIONS
LIMITING INTRABRAND COMPETITION 7 n.14 (1977) for a listing of these private actions
which include: Chicago Sugar Co. v. American Sugar Ref. Co., 176 F.2d I (7th Cir. 1949),
cert. denied, 338 U.S. 948 (1950); Fosburgh v. California & Hawaiian Sugar Ref. Co., 291
F.2d 29 (9th Cir. 1923); Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. Coca-Cola Co., 269 F. 796 (D. Del. 1920).
67. 321 U.S. 707 (1944).
68. See ABA ANTITRUST SECTION, supra note 66, at 7-8 n.17 (1977) for a listing of
these consent decrees which include: United States v. Lone Star Cadillac Co., 1963 Trade
Cas. (CCH) 70,739 (N.D. Tex. 1963); United States v. Sperry Rand Corp., 1962 Trade Cas.
(CCH)
70,495 (W.D.N.Y. 1962); United States v. Shaw-Walker Co., 1962 Trade Cas.
(CCH) 70,491 (W.D.N.Y. 1962).
69. 372 U.S. 253 (1963).
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rangements emerge"7 to be certain whether they stifle or invigorate
competition. Therefore, it remanded the case for a trial on the merits.7" In light of the three dissenters' argument for a per se rule, the
opinion was widely interpreted as applying a rule of reason approach to nonprice vertical restraints.72 In fact, the Court merely
ruled "that the legality of territorial and customer limitations
should be determined only after a trial."7 3 The case was settled on
remand and, therefore, the Court did not have an opportunity to
determine whether the per se rule or rule of reason applied to nonprice vertical restraints.
Nevertheless, it seemed that the rule of reason was the appropriate standard as two appeals courts almost immediately overturned
more stringent Federal Trade Commission decisions.74 Neither
court, nor for that matter, the Supreme Court in White Motor,
heeded the argument that nonprice dealer restrictions violated
property law rights of resale. Thus, it came as a surprise when the
Supreme Court returned to the rationale of Dr. Miles and held in
United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co.," that "[o]nce the manufacturer has parted with title and risk. . . his effort thereafter to restrict territory or persons to whom the product may be transferred
. . . is a per se violation of § 1 of the Sherman Act."7 6
The sweeping nature of the Schwinn rule was immediately and
harshly criticized.7 7 Lower courts applied the decision narrowly
and developed numerous exceptions.7" Partly in response to
Schwinn, a new economic view of vertical restrictions became
70. Id. at 263.
71. Id. at 264.
72. This interpretation, which is erroneous, is still repeated. See, eg., Halverson, An
Overview of Legal and Economic Issues and the Relevance of the Vertical Merger Guidelines,
52 ANTrrRusT L.J. 49, 55 (1983).
73. 372 U.S. at 264.
74. See Sandura Co. v. FTC, 339 F.2d 847 (6th Cir. 1964) (dealer restrictions were
reasonable business practices); Snap-On Tools Corp. v. FTC, 321 F.2d 825 (7th Cir. 1963)
(territorial restrictions are permissible vertical restraints under a rule of reason standard).
75. 388 U.S. 365 (1967).
76. Id. at 382.
77. See, eg., Posner, Antitrust Policy and the Supreme Court: An Analysis of the Restricted Distribution,Horizontal Merger and Potential Competition Decisions, 75 COLUM. L.
REV. 282, 295-97 (1975); Robinson, Recent Antitrust Developments, 75 COLUM. L. REv. 243,
270-72 (1975); Handler, The Twentieth AnnualAntitrust Review, 53 VA. L. REV. 1667, 168086 (1967).
78. See ABA ANTITRUST SECTION, supra note 66, at 13-14 nn.34 & 38 for a listing
which includes: Colorado Pump & Supply Co. v. Febco, Inc., 472 F.2d 637, 639 (10th Cir.),
cert. denied, 411 U.S. 987 (1973); Carter-Wallace, Inc. v. United States, 449 F.2d 1374, 137882 (Ct. CI. 1971).
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widely accepted. That view was that vertical restrictions serve
many useful ends: more efficient distribution, protection against
free-riders, and lower costs.

79

Commentators advancing this eco-

nomic approach also demonstrated that the adverse effects of vertical restraints are more theoretical than real, and in fact are
implausible given our economic structure.
The process of evaluation and change was not gradual. Shortly
after the tenth anniversary of the Schwinn decision, the next territorial restriction case reached the Supreme Court, and the law
changed abruptly. In Continental T V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., °
the Court expressly overturned Schwinn and announced that a rule
of reason test should be applied to nonprice restrictions imposed by
manufacturers on their dealers. The Court recognized that distribution restrictions could achieve efficiencies by promoting retailer and
distributor investments in promotional activities and quality
controls.8 '
B.

The Sylvania Opinion

In overruling the per se rule of Schwinn, Justice Powell quoted
at length from Justice Brandeis' elliptical statement of the rule of
reason in Chicago Board of Trade v. United States,8 2 but provided
no further elaboration.
The Brandeis formulation of the rule of reason provides that:
[T]he legality of an agreement or regulation cannot be determined by so simple a test, as whether it restrains competition.
Every agreement concerning trade, every regulation of trade, restrains. To bind, to restrain, is of their very essence. The true
test of legality is whether the restraint imposed is such as merely
regulates and perhaps thereby promotes competition or whether
it is such as may suppress or even destroy competition. To determine that question the court must ordinarily consider the facts
peculiar to the business to which the restraint is applied; its condition before and after the restraint was imposed; the nature of
the restraint, actual or probable. The history of the restraint, the
evil believed to exist, the reason for adopting the particular remedy, the purpose or end sought to be attained, are all relevant
facts. This is not because a good intention will save an otherwise
objectionable regulation or the reverse; but because knowledge of
intent may help the court to interpret facts and to predict
79.
(1975);
80.
81.
82.

See generally Posner, The Chicago School of Antitrust, 127 U. PA. L. REV. 925
R. BORK, supra note 13; Posner, supra note 5; Bork, supra note 5.
433 U.S. 36 (1977).
Id. at 55.
246 U.S. 231 (1918).
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consequences

83

The elements noted by Justice Brandeis-circumstances peculiar to the business, conditions before and after the restraint, the
nature and purpose of the restraint-are necessary to the rule of
reason analysis. But as such disparate commentators as Dean Robert Pitofsky8 4 and Judge Richard Posner 85 have noted, the mere listig of areas for inquiry provides virtually no guidance on the
meaning of the rule or how it should be applied.
In Sylvania the Supreme Court held that nonprice vertical restrictions should not be automatically condemned. The Court
noted that such restrictions could be used by manufacturers to penetrate new markets, to protect full-priced dealers from free-riders
who otherwise would destroy any incentives for dealer investment
in promotion and services, and to assure product quality and customer safety. 6 The Court acknowledged that, depending on the
scope of the restrictions, competition among dealers of the same
product (intrabrand competition) would be stifled.87 This, however,
could be outweighed by benefits to competition among manufacturers (interbrand competition).8"
The Court in Sylvania stated that some nonprice vertical restraints could still be per se illegal, 9 but failed to provide any guidance as to which ones. In a footnote, it reiterated that resale price
agreements remained void under the rule of Dr. Miles.9 0
Thus, the opinion in Sylvania provided little guidance for analyzing a manufacturer's nonprice vertical restrictions. It is not
clear, for example, whether the market power of the manufacturer
is important. Nor did the Court indicate whether intrabrand costs
are simply to be weighed against interbrand benefits, with the restraint upheld unless the costs outweigh the benefits. Is it important
that the likely adverse effects of any restriction on interbrand competition are minimal or nonexistent even though intrabrand competition is eliminated? Is a manufacturer to be punished with treble
damages and attorneys' fees if purported efficiencies are, in fact, not
83. Id. at 238.
84. Pitofsky, The Sylvania Case: AntitrustAnalysis ofNon-Price Vertical Restrictions, 78
COLUM. L. REv. 1, 11 (1978).

85. Posner, The Next Step in the Antitrust Treatment of RestrictedDistribution: PerSe
Legality, 48 U. Cili. L. REv. 6, 14-15 (1981).
86. 433 U.S. at 55.
87. Id. at 54.
88. Id.
89. Id. at 58.
90. Id. at 51 n.18.
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realized, and the market has already exacted a toll for this mistake?
The Court also failed to acknowledge that applying the rule of reason has generally meant that the defendant is exonerated.9 1
Lower courts have faced a steady diet of cases raising the question of the appropriate standard of proof in a nonprice vertical restriction case under a rule of reason.
III.

APPLYING THE RULE OF REASON IN THE COURTS

92

In Sylvania Justice Powell suggested two criteria for determining whether the rule of reason standard is met. The initial consideration is whether the arrangement is likely to have a "pernicious
effect" on interbrand competition. 9 The second consideration is
whether the restraint has "redeeming virtues." 9 4 These related concepts have become departure points for a rule of reason analysis.
A.

The "PerniciousEffect" Requirement

Vertical restraints that do not directly affect price were subjected to the rule of reason analysis by the Supreme Court in Sylvania because they may promote rivalry among competitors
(interbrand competition). 95 Sylvania adopted a distribution scheme
in the early 1960's to control dealer territories through location
clauses.96 These restrictions were imposed when Sylvania had one
or two percent of the U.S. market.9 7 At that time, the market
leader (RCA) had a sixty to seventy percent share of the television
set market.9" Even attributing all of Sylvania's subsequent success
to its location clauses, Sylvania still had but five percent of the market when sued several years later by a dealer.9 9 Given the numer91. This was, at least, the result until 1977. See Posner, supra note 5, at 14. But see
NCAA v. Board of Regents of the Univ. of Okla., 104 S. Ct. 2948 (1984) (an agreement
limiting television rights restrained price and output and restricted competition and, therefore, failed a rule of reason analysis); National Soc'y of Professional Eng'rs v. United States,
435 U.S. 679 (1978) (rule of reason held insufficient to exonerate defendant under a defense
based upon the assumption that competition itself is unreasonable within engineering
profession).
92. This section of the Article borrows heavily from the two excellent discussions of
nonprice restrictions: Rill, Non-Price Vertical Restraints Since Sylvania: Market Conditions
and Dual Distribution, 52 ANTrrRUST L.J. 95 (1983); W. LIEBLER, ANTrrRUST ADVISER
§§ 2.20-.21 (2d ed. 1983 Cum. Supp.). Our analysis, however, differs somewhat from theirs.
93. 433 U.S. at 58-59.
94. Id.
95. Id. at 51-52.
96. Id. at 38.
97. Id.
98. Id. at n.1.
99. Id. at 38-40.
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ous alternatives available to retail consumers, Sylvania did not have
the market power to affect the retail price of television sets. In economic terms, Sylvania's restriction on intrabrand competition could
have no adverse effect on interbrand competition or consumer
welfare.
The Court's opinion in Sylvania clearly indicates that a mere
showing of an intrabrand impact is not enough to find a pernicious
effect on competition. An adverse intrabrand impact is a necessary
result of every successful vertical restraint. Unless the restraint
reduces competition among producers of competing products (interbrand effects), the restraint cannot adversely affect competition.
Therefore, the "pernicious effect" on competition can be demonstrated only by evidence that the vertical restriction has an adverse
interbrand effect, that is, it reduces output and raises the price of
the product significantly above the competitive level in the industry
as a whole.
The burden of proving that a manufacturer's restrictions on intrabrand competition have had a "pernicious effect" on interbrand
competition will most often lie with the plaintiff in a vertical restraint case. In Daniels v. All Steel Equipment, Inc.," the Fifth
Circuit required the plaintiff, an office furniture dealer whose dealership was involuntarily terminated, to prove that his termination
adversely affected interbrand competition. 10 1 The court affirmed
the grant of summary judgment for the defendant because the plaintiff failed to present any evidence of an anticompetitive effect involv10 2
ing more than the manufacturer's product.
The Second Circuit, in Oreck Corp. v. Whirlpool Corp.,1"3 used
an analysis similar to that of the Fifth Circuit in Daniels and required that the plaintiff present evidence of an adverse effect on interbrand competition. The plaintiff, a distributor of Whirlpool
vacuum cleaners, alleged that his dealership was terminated in an
100. 590 F.2d 111 (5th Cir. 1979). See also Carlson Machine Tools, Inc. v. American
Tool, Inc., 678 F.2d 1253 (5th Cir. 1982) (plaintiff's evidence is insufficient to establish coercive enforcement of suggested prices); Kestenbaum v. Falstaff Brewing Corp., 575 F.2d 564
(5th Cir. 1978) (plaintiff's evidence held insufficient to support its claim that the brewer's
activities had any anticompetitive effect), cer denied, 440 U.S. 909 (1979). But see
Mendelovitz v. Adolph Coors Co., 693 F.2d 570, 575 (5th Cir. 1982) (per se rule applicable if
behavior is determined to have such a pernicious effect on competition that it is conclusively
presumed to be an unreasonable restraint of trade).
101. 590 F.2d at 113.
102. Id. at 113-14.
103. 579 F.2d 126 (2d Cir.), cert denied, 439 U.S. 946 (1978). See also Borger v. Yamaha
Int'l Corp., 625 F.2d 390 (2d Cir. 1980) (en bane) (the legality of an agreement depended
upon the effect of a restraint on interbrand competition).
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effort by Whirlpool and another distributor to end all price competition in Whirlpool vacuum cleaner sales. 1" Finding for the defendant, the court noted that something more than an agreement5
10
between Whirlpool and the other distributor must be proven.
The court required that the plaintiff show "that from this course of
conduct there was an anticompetitive effect on the vacuum cleaner
industry as a whole."10 6 Relying on Colgate, the court stated that it
is a manufacturer's prerogative to decide with whom he will deal
and that a mere refusal to deal should not be a basis for antitrust

liability. 107
In determining whether a nonprice vertical restraint actually
has a "pernicious effect" on competition, several courts have focused on the likely interbrand effect of the restriction by examining
whether the manufacturer, in fact, had any power over the market.
Two questions are often addressed to determine a defendant's market power: (1) whether the defendant has a substantial share of the
market and (2) whether the defendant competes with other manufacturers of the same product.
Judge Richard Posner of the Seventh Circuit concluded in Valley Liquors, Inc. v. Renfield Importers, Ltd. 0o that a plaintiff must
initially demonstrate that the defendant had significant market
power as evidenced by a significant share of the market.109 In upholding the district court's denial of the plaintiff's motion for a preliminary injunction, the court relied on the plaintiff's failure to show
that the defendant had significant market power." 0 Without such
market power it was presumed that the defendant had no ability to
raise prices significantly above the competitive level without losing
business to competing sellers.1 11 Only after significant market share
is proven should a court address whether the restraint has sufficient
redeeming virtues to satisfy the rule of reason. 1 2 That is, without
market power the nonprice restraint can have no adverse effect on
104. 579 F.2d at 128.
105. Id. at 133. See Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Serv. Corp., 104 S.Ct. 1464 (1984).
106. 579 F.2d at 133.
107. Id.
108. 678 F.2d 742 (7th Cir. 1982). See also Graphic Prods. Distribs. v. Itek Corp., 717
F.2d 1560 (1 1th Cir. 1983) (plaintiff must establish defendant's market power); Davis-Watkins Co. v. Service Merchandise Co., 686 F.2d 1190 (6th Cir. 1982) (upheld a jury instruction
requiring the consideration of market power when applying a rule of reason test), cert denied,
104 S.Ct. 1718 (1983).
109. 678 F.2d at 745.
110. lid.
111. Id.
112. See, e.g., Davis-Watkins, 686 F.2d at 1202.
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The
interbrand competition. Therefore, it is presumed to be lawful.
113
Fifth and the Ninth Circuits also follow this approach.
What constitutes a significant market share and, therefore, sufficient market power to affect interbrand competition adversely has
not been answered authoritatively. Three recent decisions from the
Ninth Circuit are illustrative. First, in JBL Enterprises, Inc. v.
Jhirmack,"' the court held that a market share of between two and
four percent was "too small for any restraint on intrabrand competition to have a substantially adverse effect on interbrand competition."1 ' This seems to suggest that a substantial share of the
market, perhaps one-third to one-half, might satisfy a plaintiff's
burden. However, in Cowley v. Braden Industries,Inc.," 6 the court
ruled that the plaintiff must supply independent evidence of diminishing interbrand competition even though the seller had between
seventy and eighty percent of the market in windmills. 1 17 This need
for additional evidence also was apparent in the circuit court's approval of summary judgment for Sylvania after the case was remanded to it."' In Sylvania, the court pointed to the existence of
other "viable television manufacturers available to sell to any retailers who wished to enter the Sacramento market, and [evidence that]
their products were interchangeable with Sylvania's." 1 9
Some courts have suggested in dicta that a vertical restraint
might fail without supporting evidence of interbrand competition in
the market. One possible consequence of the desire for such evidence is that the burden of presenting it may be placed upon the
defendant. In Muenster Butane, Inc. v. Stewart Co.,12 the Fifth
Circuit seemed to limit its requirement that the plaintiff show an
adverse effect on interbrand competition to those situations where
113. See, eg., Muenster Butane, Inc. v. Stewart Co., 651 F.2d 292, 298 (5th Cir. 1981);
Cowley v. Braden Indus., Inc., 613 F.2d 751, 755 (9th Cir.), cerL denied, 446 U.S. 965 (1980).
114. 1982-83 Trade Cas. (CCH) 65,199 at 71,828 (9th Cir. 1983).
115. Id. See also Hood v. Tenneco Texas Life Ins. Co., 739 F.2d 1012 (5th Cir. 1984)
(less than 5% of the market share insufficient to establish market power); Ron Tonkin Gran
Turismo, Inc. v. Fiat Distribs., Inc., 637 F.2d 1376, 1379 (9th Cir. 1981) (defendant's share of
foreign car market was between 2.48 and 5.2%); Mutual Fund Investors v. Putnam Management Co., 553 F.2d 620, 627 (9th Cir. 1977) (defendant's sales of mutual funds comprised
only 2 to 3% of total sales in the relevant market). But see Graphic Prods. Distribs. v. Itek
Corp., 717 F.2d 1560, 1570 (11th Cir. 1983) (70 to 75% market share sufficient to establish
significant market power).
116. 613 F.2d 751 (9th Cir.), cerL denied, 446 U.S. 965 (1980).
117. Id. at 756.
118. 1982-83 Trade Cas. (CCH) 64,962, at 72,967 (9th Cir. 1982).
119. Id.
120. 651 F.2d 292 (5th Cir. 1981); see also H & B Equip. Co. v. International Harvester
Co., 577 F.2d 239 (5th Cir. 1978) (healthy interbrand competition established by evidence).
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"[s]tiff interbrand competition in the relevant market shielded the
consumer from an anticompetitive effect of [the manufacturer's] attempts to reduce the rivalry between dealers." 12 1 The concern in
Muenster Butane and allied decisions seems to be that the costs to
consumers of diminishing intrabrand competition might outweigh
any benefits from interbrand competition if there is no interbrand
competition in the market. One panel of the Second Circuit Court
of Appeals explicitly adopted this balancing approach in ruling for a
terminated dealer in Eiberger v. Sony Corp. of America. 2 2 This judicial cost-benefit approach to vertical restraints seems contrary to
the Supreme Court's statement inSylvania that interbrand competition is the primary concern of antitrust law. 123 And as the only
appellate case where the plaintiff-dealer has prevailed, Eibergermay
12 4
be an aberration.
Although the absence of interbrand impact probably should be
the controlling factor in upholding a vertical restraint, a majority of
tribunals also look to other market conditions. Perhaps the leading
advocate of this view is former FTC Commissioner David Clanton
who, in Beltone Electronic Corp.,'"5 relied on a number of market
conditions to justify the territorial restrictions. Beltone's mere sixteen percent market share 2 6 alone did not enable it to require its
dealers to work only within assigned geographical areas and to deal
exclusively in Beltone hearing aids.127 Looking beyond Beltone's
market share, Commissioner Clanton relied on the rise of new distributional methods, the entry and growth of new competitors, and
128
the resulting change in the market position of the leading firms.
This analysis is similar to the approach adopted by the Third Circuit in American Motor Inns, Inc. v. Holiday Inns, Inc. 129
In American Motor Inns, the plaintiff (AMI), the largest franchisee of Holiday Inns (HI), sued HI following HI's denial of
121. 651 F.2d at 298.
122. 622 F.2d 1068 (2d Cir. 1980). But see Abadir & Co. v. First Miss. Corp., 651 F.2d
422 (5th Cir. 1981); Borger v. Yamaha Int'l Corp., 625 F.2d 390 (2d Cir. 1980).
123. 433 U.S. 36, 52 n.19 (1977).
124. See text accompanying infra notes 151-55.
125.

3 TRADE REG. REP. (CCH)

21,934 (1982).

126. Id. 22,395.
127. Id. 22,375.
128. Id. 22,395.
129. 521 F.2d 1230 (3d Cir. 1975). See also Tripoli Co. v. Wella Corp., 425 F.2d 932 (3d
Cir.) (motive stemming from protection of public from harm is sufficient lawful purpose to
support resale restrictions of potentially dangerous products), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 831
(1970).
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AMI's application to open a new franchise. 130 Under its standard
licensing agreement, HI also refused to allow AMI to build any
other type of hotel in the disputed areas.131 The Third Circuit vacated that part of the district court's judgment which held that the
"non-Holiday Inn" clause failed a rule of reason analysis. 132 The
court noted that the district court failed to consider not only the
relevant market share but also such other factors as "the total competition extant in the industry," "the effect of the challenged restriction on the market
structure," and "the number and size of firms in
3
the industry."

13

In sum, the case law reflects uncertainty about the impact of
vertical restraints on interbrand competition. The primary dispute
is whether a modest market share alone insulates a nonprice vertical
restraint from attack or whether "other factors" must be weighed in
determining its legality. Secondary, but still unanswered, issues include: what constitutes a substantial market share, whether a significant market share alone triggers a finding of actual or likely
adverse effect or merely requires the defendant to come forward
with anecdotal or economic evidence of no adverse market effect,
and what other evidence is necessary to justify a restraint despite
insubstantial market shares.
B.

The Redeeming Virtues of the Restraint

While most judicial attention has focused on the manufacturer's
market power, the courts and the FTC also have reviewed the justifications for the restraint, at least where market power was more
than de minimis or was not insignificant.
In a typical rule of reason case, the business rationale for the
restraint is the focal point of the defendant's case. For example, in
Red Diamond Supply, Inc. v. Liquid Carbonic Corp.,'3 4 the plaintiff
alleged that Liquid Carbonic Corp. and three of its distributors conspired to maintain territorial and customer restrictions on the sale
of Liquid's products.13 5 Red Diamond claimed that its distributor136
ship was terminated because it transgressed these restrictions.
The Fifth Circuit considered not only the "pernicious effect" on in130.
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.

521 F.2d at 1235.
Id. at 1248.
Id. at 1247.
Id.
637 F.2d 1001 (5th Cir. 1981).
Id. at 1002.
Id.
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terbrand competition, which it found to be nonexistent, but also the
"redeeming virtues" of the restraints.1 37 In particular, the court
found that the restrictions enabled the manufacturer to serve its
customers more effectively, thereby actually intensifying interbrand
competition. 138
In Mendelovitz v. Adolph Coors Co.,139 the plaintiff beer wholesaler brought suit against a manufacturer for refusal to deal. The
plaintiff had refused to honor territorial limitations and, as a result,
was terminated by the manufacturer. The court found that the restriction was "essential to the efficient functioning of [Coors'] quality control procedure,"" 4 which was designed to avoid the adverse
effects of age, light, and heat on the quality of the beer. Other cases
have noted the manufacturer's desire to have dealers maintain adequate storage and inventories as legitimate business reasons for a
restraint.141
In another dealer termination case, Donald B. Rice Tire Co. v.
Michelin Tire Corp.,142 the court analyzed a territorial limitation
placed by a tire manufacturer on its dealers. The court discussed
the numerous marketing efficiencies which might be achieved
through the imposition of vertical restraints. 143 With regard to the
defendant's particular justifications for the territorial restrictions,
the court felt that the manufacturer's concern that unauthorized
dealers would neither advertise nor be able to perform necessary
repair services justified the territorial restraint.1" The court found
evidence that the plaintiff, in fact, was free-riding on the promotional efforts and services provided by authorized dealers 14 and,
therefore, concluded that the manufacturer's decision to terminate
the plaintiff's dealership for refusal to comply with the restriction
was not unreasonable. 146
This notion of free-riders is prominent in the economic literature justifying manufacturer imposition of vertical restraints and
was a persuasive influence on the Supreme Court's decision in Syl137. Id. at 1005-06.
138. Id. at 1006.
139. 693 F.2d 570 (5th Cir. 1982).
140. Id. at 576.
141. See Abadir & Co. v. First Miss. Corp., 651 F.2d 422 (5th Cir. 1981); Cowley v.
Braden Indus., Inc., 613 F.2d 751 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 965 (1980).
142. 483 F. Supp. 750 (D. Md. 1980), aff'd per curiam, 638 F.2d 15 (4th Cir.), cert
denied, 454 U.S. 864 (1981).
143. Id. at 756.
144. Id. at 757, 758-59.
145. Id. at 757-58.
146. Id. at 762.
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vania.147 The FTC's opinion in Beltone14 8 also examined the economic implications of free-riders. Without its territorial
restrictions, Beltone's "advance-contact system," whereby dealers
identified and tested potential hearing aid users, could easily be undercut by dealers from outside the territory.14 9 Effective advertising
programs also might have been hindered, according to the Commission.15 It is not clear from the opinion whether these justifications
were necessary to the respondent's exoneration or merely an additional, alternative holding.
Only one appellate post-Sylvania decision has found a vertical
price restraint unjustified.15 In the somewhat bizarre Eiberger
case, one dealer sought to "enforce" a manufacturer's territorial
program by going on a rampage and ripping open boxes in another
dealer's store looking for evidence of extraterritorial sales.1 5 2 In
iberger, the warranty service assessment imposed by Sony on all
authorized dealers might have been difficult to explain because it
applied whether or not warranty services were in fact performed. 53
In any case, a panel of the Second Circuit concluded that the manufacturer's objectives could have been achieved by a less restrictive
requirement such as paying the dealer for actual warranty services. 54 The importance of this decision seems to have been undercut by another panel which did not adhere to the less restrictive
155
alternative approach in upholding a territorial clause.
As this review suggests, the number of cases evaluating the "redeeming virtues" of a restraint is still relatively few. Like Justice
Powell, they do little more than list the justifications or announce
why a particular restraint could be reasonable. Neither the analysis
nor empirical data seem particularly impressive.
147. 433 U.S. at 55.
148. 3 TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) 21,934 (1982).
149. Id. 22,385. That is, competing discounters could rely on Beltone's activities informing consumers of their hearing loss to sell these customers hearing aids. Without incurring these advance-contact costs, the free-riding competitors would have a substantial cost
advantage.
150. Id. 22,383.
151. Eiberger v. Sony Corp. of Am., 622 F.2d 1068 (2d Cir. 1980).
152. Id. at 1073-74.
153. Id. at 1077-78.
154. Id.
155. Borger v. Yamaha Int'l Corp., 625 F.2d 390 (2d Cir. 1980).
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RATIONALIZING THE "RULE OF REASON"

A.

Vertical Restraint Cases

The rule of reason standard is increasingly important as courts
apply it not only to vertical restraints but also to arrangements
which traditionally have been per se illegal. Therefore, it is important that the standard be developed in a manner which provides
guidance to both the courts and the business community. Unfortunately, the standard has not been adequately developed in the vertical restraint cases. Most vertical restraint cases at the appellate
level present contract rather than antitrust questions. Whether a
manufacturer's termination of a dealer because of inadequate dealer
performance or a change in distribution patterns was authorized or
contemplated by the parties at the time of contract formation is a
question for contract law.56 However, habits developed under the
Schwinn rule, and antitrust remedies providing for treble damages
and attorneys' fees, encourage disappointed dealers to pursue antitrust remedies as well. The result after Sylvania is that these plaintiffs usually lose.
It is clear from these cases that counsel for plaintiffs have not
fully understood the meaning of Sylvania, at least as interpreted by
most commentators and lower courts. This confusion is not surprising given the ambiguous and incomplete development of the
economic factors to be considered under the rule of reason standard
as set forth in Sylvania. The difficulty is that the Court has only
partially accepted the economic theory of then-Professors Bork' 5 7
and Posner.' 5 8 This theory illustrates that vertical restrictions are
generally harmless because they do not create market power or restrict output and are likely to be adopted to achieve the manufacturer's and dealer's marketing goals.
The Court's failure to embrace fully the legality of vertical restraints probably lies in the difficulty of forging a six-person majority to overturn Schwinn. To do so, Justice Powell apparently had to
distinguish Dr. Miles and leave the per se rule undisturbed.I5 9 As a
156. See, e.g., Gellhorn, Limitations on Contract Termination Rights-FranchiseCancellations, 1967 DUKE L.J. 465; Goldberg, The Law and Economics of Vertical Restrictions: A
Relational Perspective, 58 TEx. L. Rav. 91 (1981).
157. See Bork, supra note 5.
158. See Posner, supra note 77.
159. Cf. Justice William Rehnquist's speech of Sept. 15, 1984, quoting former Chief Justice Hughes, quoted in N.Y. Times, Sept. 16, 1984, § 1, at 27.
If our opinions seem on occasion to be internally inconsistent, to contain a logical
fallacy, or to insufficiently distinguish a prior case, I commend you to the view
attributed to Chief Justice Hughes upon his retirement from our Court in 1941. He
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result, the Court did not focus exclusively on the economic effects
(i.e., output restrictions) of the arrangement on interbrand competition alone-although it acknowledged that interbrand effects were
the primary concern." 6 Instead, it confused the issue by discussing
the intrabrand impact of the restraint and by condemning all direct
price-fixing. As Professor Wesley J. Liebler points out, all vertical
restraints, price or nonprice, have similar price effects and cannot be
distinguished on economic or other analytical grounds. 6 1
Where does this leave the practicing attorney forced to represent
his client and the law before a court? Where does it leave a lower
court? One route, of course, is to invite the Supreme Court to rethink elements of its Sylvania decision and to correct current analytical and doctrinal limitations. This is not an appealing
suggestion for most practitioners whose clients are not anxious for
their disputes to become test cases. Nor does it really help the conscientious judge bound by precedent.
On the other hand, the inherent inconsistencies in Sylvania and
the divergent case authority provide creative counsel and judges
with an opportunity to rationalize not only the law of vertical restraints but also the law governing arrangements which traditionally have been per se illegal and now are being subjected to a rule of
reason analysis. If the bench and bar are to seize this opportunity,
they must understand why certain restraints are being tested by a
rule of reason. The theory underlying the Court's analysis of vertical restraints in Sylvania is simply that vertical restraints generally
are adopted to achieve marketing goals such as dealer servicing and
advertising. Vertical constraints are designed by manufacturers to
gain an edge on their competitors. They are unlikely to have an
interbrand effect unless they are part of a dealer or manufacturer
cartel. Both economic and legal analysis, as numerous commentators have explained, demonstrate that the use of vertical restraints
to achieve either kind of cartel is highly unlikely.1 62
Proof under the rule of reason standard should concentrate on
evidence indicating that the vertical restraint is an integral part of
an agreement among manufacturers or dealers to fix prices among
said that he always tried to write his opinions logically and clearly, but if a Justice
whose vote was necessary to make a majority insisted that particular language be
put in, in it went, and let the law reviews figure out what it meant.
Id.
160. 433 U.S. at 52 n.19.
161. Liebler, 1983 Economic Review ofAntitrust Developments: The DistinctionBetween
Price and Nonprice DistributionRestrictions, 31 UCLA L. REv. 384 (1983).
162. See Posner, supra note 5; Posner, supra note 77.
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competing firms at one level or another. Evidence of an agreement
between a manufacturer and dealer, despite the Monsanto decision,
will not support such a finding since it generally is not in the interest of one to foster a cartel by the other.
Although the Court's decision in Monsanto failed to set forth an
adequate standard for proving the existence of a "conspiracy," it is
clear that "something more" is required than mere evidence that a
dealer's termination was preceded by price complaints. It also
should not be enough to show that the terminated dealer charged
lower prices or was a maverick since nonprice vertical restraints are
likely to be designed to assure uniformity in distribution and to
achieve improved product and service quality. Evidence that vertical restrictions support a horizontal cartel should be viewed skeptically since the cartelization of a market is exceedingly difficult
without some sort of government assistance through, for example,
blocking patents or sealed bid procedures. Finally, the current focus on market share seems analytically unsound even though it is
not likely to result in error. Its effect is to focus time and attention
on less significant evidence of market power rather than on direct
evidence of reduced output or higher prices.
B. Per Se Violations
It is clear from the opinions in Broadcast Music, Hyde, Monsanto, and NCAA that there also are valid economic justifications
for arrangements which traditionally have been considered per se
illegal. The Court is critically analyzing these arrangements in
modern economic terms. Before subjecting a defendant to the per
se rule, the Court has analyzed some horizontal restraints in a manner similar to the rule of reason approach followed in vertical restraint cases. In Broadcast Music, 6 the Court examined a
horizontal agreement to fix prices, typically a per se violation of
section 1 of the Sherman Act, in terms of its competitive effects and
redeeming virtues. The Court applied a similar rule of reason analysis in Hyde' to uphold a tying arrangement, although it left the
general per se approach to tying theoretically intact. In Hyde the
Court also considered the market power of the parties to the agreement and the effect of the restraint on competition in the market.
In NCAA, 165 the Court conducted a rule of reason analysis before
163. 441 U.S. 1 (1979).
164. 104 S. Ct. 1551 (1984).
165. 104 S. Ct. 2948 (1984).
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rejecting the college athletic association's justifications for an agreement limiting the number of college football games on television.
It is especially important to develop the meaning of the rule of
reason analysis in light of the Court's movement away from a rigid
application of the per se rule. This analysis typically entails a discussion of the "pernicious effects" on competition and the "redeeming virtues" of the restraint. Anticompetitive effects most often are
analyzed in terms of the defendant's market share and, in some
courts, other evidence of market conditions. The concentration on
market share is misplaced.1 66 The focus of the analysis should be
on the likely effects of the restraint. If industry output is not affected, it is irrelevant what effect the arrangement has on a particular manufacturer's output. Of course, manufacturers are likely to
seek increased output and improved market positions. Claims to
the contrary should bear a heavy burden. Otherwise, application of
the antitrust laws will reduce rivalry and, as a consequence, harm
consumer welfare.
V.

CONCLUSION

The Supreme Court's most recent antitrust decisions illustrate a
breakdown of the previous guidelines on when to apply the per se
rule or the rule of reason standard. Whether a restraint will be subjected to a per se rule or whether it passes a rule of reason test is to
be determined by very similar economic considerations. The standard under the rule of reason, as set forth by Justice Powell in Sylvania and in subsequent Supreme Court cases, provides little
guidance on the meaning of the rule. The Court is gradually embracing a "consumer welfare" approach to antitrust analysis and
deviations in this movement, such as the approach in Maricopa,167
seem unlikely to flourish. The current situation presents an oppor166. Since vertical restrictions generally cannot alter market power significantly, it is also
inappropriate to rely on market concentration analysis in applying the rule of reason standard
to vertical restraints. As a filter for prosecutorial discretion, as applied by the Department of
Justice's Vertical Restraints Guidelines and, separately, by Professor Easterbrook, they may
be an inexpensive device for approving obviously harmless restrictions. See Vertical Restraint
Guidelines, [Spec. Supp.] ANTrrRUST & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) No. 1199 (Jan. 24, 1985);
Easterbrook, The Limits of Antitrust, 63 TEX. L. RE. 1 (1984). The danger is that this test
will be applied affirmatively to challenge vertical restraints even though competition is intense
and the restraints enhance consumer welfare. The history of the use of concentration measures to find horizontal mergers presumptively illegal justifies this concern, particularly in the
absence of theoretical and empirical support. Cf Gellhorn, Government MergerPolicy and
Practice- 1983, 52 ANTITRUST L.J. 419 (1983).
167. Arizona v. Maricopa Co. Medical Soc'y, 457 U.S. 332 (1982).
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tunity to rationalize the rule of reason and shape the future of anti-

trust analysis in terms of modem economic considerations.

